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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present a model of international environmental agreements in the 
presence of threshold effects. The model is in the tradition of models of international 
environmental agreements formulated as games in partition function form. Games in 
partition function form allow the incorporation of external effects between players. The 
model is applied to global climate change agreements. The agreement involves a contract 
between nations as to the level of abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and how these 
benefits are to be shared. Benefits to emissions abatement are subject to a threshold. 
Consequently, we model climate as a global threshold public good. This allows a 
mechanism to explore incentives and disincentives for signing agreements consequent to 
a critical number of other players committing to an agreement. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Climate change, water security, and the loss of biological diversity are some of the most 
important environmental problems that undermine the sustainability of the modern 
interconnected economies. All these problems share a common thread in that 
uncoordinated individual actions are contributing to the depletion of commonly held 
property that form an integral part of the global natural environment. The uncertainties 
relating to the nature of cause and effect and the inability to hold individuals to account 
for damage makes it necessary to reach a solution through cooperation. International 
Environmental Agreements (IEAs) negotiated between nations are an example of a global 
policy instrument designed to improve global welfare. The challenge in the IEAs has 
been to  make them not only profitable, but also self-enforcing, due in part for incentives 
for nation to join and remain committed in their own self-interest (Fuentes-Albero, & 
Rubio 2010). 
 
Theliterature on the minimum number of players needed to form an effective 
international environmental agreement (IEA) includes Cararro, et al. (2004).  In their 
work, the  participation problem is formulated as a three-stage game where players 
choose the minimum proportion of the total number of players who must be signatories in 
the first stage of the game. In this paper, we argue that it is not so much the number of 
players but their contribution to emissions or abatement is the central issue. We therefore 
model IEA as a game in partition function form with a threshold or provision point public 
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bad, namely greenhouse gas emissions. Games in partition function form were first 
proposed by Thrall and Lucas (1963) and later applied to strategic cooperation in 
international environmental agreements ), for example by Chander and Tulkens (1997) 
and, McQuillin (2008) 
 
Barratt (1994) also uses a similar set-up although in his model Chander and Tulkens' 
damage function takes the form of a benefit function, and emissions are replaced with 
abatement levels.  In that model, the transformation function becomes a cost function. 
The differences, however, do not appear to be essential in informing the outcome.  
 
In this paper, we examine how a threshold or provision point affects the partial agreement 
equilibrium. In other words, does a high threshold - an emissions level that is unlikely to 
be reached, leading to a smaller group of signatories in equilibrium? Then, can a partial 
agreement equilibrium induce emissions levels that drive the ambient greenhouse gas 
concentration below the provision point? This is really the key practical question, 
because if this is not the case, then IEA will be ineffective in eradicating damage. 
Perhaps eradication of damage is wishful thinking and in a world where damage is 
continuous and thresholds don’t play a role this is indeed the case. On the other hand, we 
may not have exceeded a critical threshold, or if we have, we may not have exceeded by 
too much, and still through sensible management practices, able to push ambient 
greenhouse gas concentrations back below some threshold. An important question is: Are 
IEA with a limited number of signatories able to do this? We examine this question 
below. 
 
2. The Model 
The model is based on Chander (2007) and Chander and Tulkens (1997). We consider a 
game between N players or countries where N={1,…,n}. Furthermore, we will consider a 
partition of this set such that: ( )mSSP ,,1 K=  and 
NS j
m
j ==1U  
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Where, for all ∅=∩≠ ji SSji ,  and we will refer to this partition as a coalition 
structure.  
 
Commodities are of two types: a private good niyi ,,1, K=  and a public bad which 
represents the ambient level of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere (e.g. 
CO2). The private good iy  is related to greenhouse gas emissions ie  according to the 
following transformation function: 
 
( ) Niegy ii ∈= ,  and ∑
∈
=
Ni
iez . 
 
Our model then departs somewhat from the Chander and Tulkens (1997) framework by 
introducing the idea that environmental damage (i.e. climate change) should be 
considered a threshold public good. In other words emissions only induce damage when 
the ambient level of greenhouse gases exceeds some threshold which in the threshold 
public goods literature is typically referred to as a provision point. Consequently we 
model consumer preferences in terms of a provision point mechanism: 
 
( ) ( ),, zvyzyu iii −=  if 0zz >  and ( ) iii yzyu =,  if 0zz ≤ .  
 
Where the provision point 0z  may be interpreted as a threshold below which total 
emissions are insufficient to induce environmental damage in the sense of global 
warming.  
 
We now proceed as follows: first, we determine the Pareto efficient allocation in each of 
these cases before defining the γ -characteristic function and γ -core of the game.  Then 
we analyze for each case the conditions under which a partial agreement equilibrium (a 
particular type of Nash equilibrium for partition function form games) exists before 
proceeding to study how the existence of a “provision point” may impact on the Chander-
Tulkens solution to the game. We also examine the implications of provision points for 
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fair division solution concepts in the Shapley-value family, e.g. Owen-value and 
McQuillin’s extended and generalized Shapley value which we will refer to as the 
McQuillin-value.  
 
If ( )**1 , nee K  are the Pareto efficient emissions then for the first case the first order 
conditions are given by ( ) ( )zvneg i ′=′ * and in the second case one obtains ( ) 0* =′ ieg . 
From the latter condition we can deduce that 0
0
=
=zzdz
dv for some 0>n . These 
conditions are interesting because, assumption 4 of Chander and Tulkens (1997) allows 
for threshold public goods but they do not analyze the formation of international 
environmental agreements in terms of this threshold but only in order to set-up the 
damage function. In their later work they drop this specification and assume away a 
provision point - this allows them to weaken the assumptions they require regarding 
concavity of the transformation function.  
 
 
We now consider case I in more detail. In terms of a strategic game first we define the 
strategy space { }00: eeeT iii ≤≤= , and nTTT ××= K1  and utility profile ( )nuuu K,1=
. This defines a game ( )uTN ,,=Γ . 
Denote the Nash equilibrium of this game by ( )nee K,1 . Given a coalition structure P we 
can define a coalitional equilibrium as 
( ) ( ) mjeevege
j jj
j
si SNk
k
Si
iiSii ,,2,1,maxarg
\
K=
























+−= ∑ ∑∑
∈ ∈∈
∈
 
Note that this implies that 0
\
zee
jj SNk
k
Si
i >+ ∑∑
∈∈
. 
We now consider case II in more detail. In this case the coalitional equilibrium plays no 
role and one obtains ( ) nieg i ,...,1,0 ==′ , in other words the game theoretic character of 
the problem disappears and each country unilaterally determines emissions level as they 
see fit. Their emissions have no impact on each-other.  
 6
3. The γ -characteristic function 
We now consider a partition consisting of a coalition S and a number of individual 
players, the coalitional equilibrium now takes the form (partial agreement equilibrium): 
 
( ) ( )
























+−= ∑ ∑∑
∈ ∈∈
∈
si SNj
j
Si
iiSii eevege
\
ˆmaxargˆ  
 
And  
 
( ) SNjeevege
jiNi
jijj \,ˆmaxargˆ
,
∈
















+−= ∑
≠∈
. 
 
The first of these gives the conditions under which the coalition S maximizes welfare and 
the second gives the best-response of a non-member of the coalition to the optimal 
emissions decisions of the coalition. We now introduce the γ -characteristic function: 
( ) ( )∑ ∑
∈ ∈ 















−≡
Si Nj
ji evegSw ˆˆ
γ
. 
 
Therefore the γ -characteristic function gives an expression for the surplus welfare 
generated by coalition members. In the event of emissions are constrained to not exceed 
the threshold the disutility term in each of these expressions will be zero. This completes 
the set-up of the model. 
 
The rest of our paper considers the implications of thresholds for proposition 5 of 
Chander and Tulkens (1997). Proposition 5 is here re-stated without proof in slightly 
modified form. 
 
Proposition 1: For all ( ) ( ),,2,, * zvzvnSNSNS s ′≥′≥≠⊂ where Sn denotes the size of 
coalition S  and corresponds to the Nash (disagreement) equilibrium z   and Pareto 
 7
efficient levels of ambient emissions *z  respectively. Then the emission level of each 
player in the coalition of a partial agreement equilibrium is not higher than the emission 
level corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. 
 
The result as stated here relies on symmetry of the disutility of ambient emissions. This 
assumption was not made in Chander and Tulkens (1997) but is made in later work, e.g. 
Chander (2007). 
 
Our first result is a corollary of this. This result is not really surprising and rather obvious 
however it is presented because it will be referred to later.  
 
Proposition 2: Given the validity of proposition 1 there is some minimal size of the 
coalition that guarantees at least one signatory to the agreement. 
 
Proof: Proposition 1 implies that zzz ≤≤ ˆ* , however, strict concavity of the damage 
function implies ( ) ( )zvzv ′>′ *  (see figure 1). This implies 1<≥ εSn . If *z  is less than 
the threshold then coalition size will be large as long as the disagreement equilibrium 
does not induce emissions that are too large. In other words if one is already too far above 
the threshold the coalition size will be small. ■ 
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Figure 1: damage or disutility function 
 
 
Because the harmful emissions threshold for 'dangerous global warming' is not precisely 
known, it is important to analyse how to reduce emissions if the coalition membership 
were to remain below the critical membership threshold?  
 
Consider the following situation. Initially 0zz > , however, as a result of the agreement 
emissions zˆ  are reduced to a level: 0ˆ zz < . We assume here that emissions under the 
Pareto-optimal outcome are even lower. In other words, we assume both the potential for 
the success in terms of emission reductions of a full agreement and the success on the 
same terms of a 'partial agreement equilibrium'. This however has as a consequence that 
ex-post each player maximizes their own private benefits to emissions and that 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) iegegeg iii ∀=′=′=′ ,0ˆ* . 
 
damage 
v(z) 
z 
Z0 
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It is possible that this behaviour could induce an aggregate level of emissions that would 
be once again lie above the threshold. Therefore, any viable agreement requires an 
additional condition for it to be workable and effective in keeping emissions below the 
harmful threshold. We term this condition ex-post robustness. It is likely related to the 
idea of ex-post implementation and robust implementation in the mechanism design 
literature, however that literature is largely non-cooperative in nature rather than 
cooperative [see for example, Bergemann & Morris (2008, 2009)]. Firstly we define the 
ex-post emissions equilibrium as follows. 
 
Definition1: Ex-post emissions equilibrium . 
 
( ) ( ) Niege iNiepi ∈∀=∈ ,maxarg  
 
Note that this is not the same as the disagreement equilibrium, which is defined in terms 
of damage from emissions. The ex-post equilibrium assumes that damaging levels of 
emissions have been eradicated although not necessarily that all emissions have been 
eradicated. 
 
Definition 2: Ex-post robustness. A partial agreement equilibrium ( )
SNjSiji ee \,ˆ,ˆ ∈∈ is said 
to be ex-post robust iff 0zz ep ≤ . 
If the agreement were not ex-post robust, then self-interested behavior of all parties 
whether signatories or not after successful reduction of emissions would lead to 
emissions again increasing to a new level above the provision point threshold which 
would trigger the need for a new agreement. Essentially the initial IEA would not be time 
consistent, although fully exploring time consistency properties would require 
development of a multi-period or fully dynamic model of IEA’s (see recent work by 
Pavlova, 2008). 
 
Example:  
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Consider the following utility function ∑−−=
i
iiii ecbeaeu 2 . This utility function 
assumes a linear damage function above the threshold. This induces a partial agreement 
equilibrium as follows: 
 
b
ca
e
b
cna
e SNj
S
Si 2
ˆ,
2
ˆ \
−
=
−
= ∈∈ . 
The ex-post equilibrium is  
 
Ni
b
a
eepi ∈= ,2
. 
From this it is clear that ( ) ( )
b
cn
b
c
n
b
a
n
b
ca
nn
b
cna
nz SS
S
S 2
1
2222
ˆ
2
−
−−=
−
−+
−
= . If the 
treaty is successful in reducing emissions this will be less than 0z . However, the ex-post 
equilibrium induced emissions are 
b
a
nz ep
2
= . Clearly, zz ep ˆ> . Nevertheless, there 
clearly could exist a 0z , such that .ˆ
0 zzz ep >>  So that the treaty, on being implemented, 
would create incentives for individuals to again pollute to damaging levels.   
 
The threshold could however be even larger than the ex-post emissions level, which 
would make the success of the treaty even greater in terms of emissions reductions and 
return us to a state of the world predating the era of human induced climate change. More 
likely however is that an agreement will be moderately successful in controlling 
emissions because the threshold itself for inducing damage is not that great or we have 
not already passed it by much. A low threshold is easy to cross again, and this makes for 
IEA that are unlikely to be ex-post robust. 
 
We now turn to the key question that we proposed in the introduction how in equilibrium 
is the number of signatories affected by the threshold level? Assuming a utility function 
∑−−=
i
iiii ecbeaeu 2  like that of the previous example, then we can state the following 
proposition. 
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Proposition 3: ( ) 12 0 +−−≥
c
bzcan
nS  
 
Proof: a partial agreement equilibrium for the quadratic utility function implies 
( )
0
2
2
1
2
ˆ z
b
cn
b
ca
nz S ≤
−
−
−
=  rearranging one obtains ( ) 12 0 +−−≥
c
bzcan
nS ■ 
 
Clearly, our initial intuition is valid, and in this case, a higher threshold for pollutants 
would in equilibrium result in a lower minimum threshold for membership of the 
coalition in an agreement that reduces emissions below damaging levels. This should be 
interpreted to mean that it would be hard to gain signatories to agreements if the damage 
threshold is high. Low thresholds which are easily crossed on the other hand and the 
success of which is easily achieved are easier to obtain commitment for a binding 
agreement. The downside of such agreements is that they may well not be robust as the 
previous example illustrates. 
 
Now we explore how the conditions for  internal and external stability of an agreement 
and the use of transfer payments in achieving stability. 
4. Ex-post solution of a partial IEA 
 
What consequences might thresholds have for transfers between members of a coalition? 
Consider the Chander and Tulkens transfer mechanism. This determines transfers 
between players that guarantee internal and external stability of the agreement. However, 
these transfers do not relate to the robustnesss of the agreement ex-post. Consequently, 
the Chander Tulkens solutions concept is an ex-ante solutions concept.  
 
Chander-Tulkens is defined as follows: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )





−+−−=






−
′
′
+−−=
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
Nj Nj
jjiiii
Nj Nj
jjiiiii
egeg
n
egeg
egeg
zvn
zv
egegT
**
*
*
*
*
1
 
 
The transfer iT  is positive for a transfer received and negative for transfers made. These 
transfers act to compensate players for losses due to environmental damage. The C-T 
transfer mechanism essentially applies a proportional rule to distribute the surplus of the 
grand coalition along with the opportunity cost associated with unanimous agreement 
amongst all players. It is worth noting that because the good in question is a global public 
good, these transfers are paid to all players whether or not they are signing members of a 
coalition. 
 
Note because we follow Chander (2007) in assuming that damage from climate change is 
a pure public bad and therefore identical for all players. The marginal damage does not 
appear in the C-T transfer formula. Consequently the threshold will not impact on 
transfers directly, but it will have an impact in equilibrium as the following example 
illustrates. 
 
Example: C-T mechanism with threshold 
Using the quadratic utility function from of the last example, however, with different 
parameters for different players, we can compute the Pareto efficient emissions, to be: 
 
Ni
b
nca
e
i
i
i ∈
−
= ,
2
*
. 
 
And the disagreement equilibrium is: 
Si
b
cna
e
i
Si
i ∈
−
= ,
2
. 
 
This results in the following transfers if emissions are above the threshold.  
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Simplifying, 
 
( )
( )





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


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

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Can we place a bound on transfers based on the bound on coalition size? To do this we 
need to distinguish ex-post and ex-ante cases. 
 
However c is zero if aggregate emissions are below the threshold. So we need to 
distinguish the following cases: 
i. emissions below the threshold 0=iT  
ii. emissions above the threshold 
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Therefore we only need to consider the latter case in which emissions are above the 
threshold.  
 
In this case transfers do depend on the threshold. If we consider the lower bound of 
transfers, i.e. the minimum level of transfers necessary to maintain an agreement then we 
can examine how an increase in the threshold impacts transfers. This is of interest 
because it is unclear where such a threshold may lie. Estimates of what level of emissions 
are likely to be damaging vary.  
 
As discussed earlier there clearly could exist a 0z , such that .ˆ0 zzz ep >>  So that the 
treaty, on being implemented, would create incentives for individuals to again pollute to 
damaging levels. The question is whether a policy can be devised to exclude this 
possibility? In other words can we design a policy that guarantees ex-post robustness of 
any international environmental agreement? Firstly, note that we will assume an ex-ante 
successful treaty in other word ́ < . However to guarantee ex-post robustness as we 
define it here we need ex-post emissions also to remain below the threshold. For the 
quadratic utility example ex-post emissions are given by  =  	


. While n is clearly 
independent of policy. A, and b represent the marginal private benefit of emissions and 
2b the marginal private cost of emissions. Lowering the marginal private benefit of 
emissions or raising the marginal private cost of emissions would lead to a reduction of 
ex-post emissions. If these can be reduced to a level below the damage threshold then we 
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would have achieved ou goal of reducing emissions below the threshold ex-post as well. 
The most obvious way of achieving this would be to couple negotiations on international 
environmental agreements to emissions taxes.  An emissions tax such as a carbon tax 
would raise the marginal private cost of emissions. A carbon tax would therefore 
complement transfer and compensation polcies. It is worth noting however that not every 
country may be willing to impose private sanctions on its citizens in order to guarantee a 
successful outcome. The unconstitutionality of the proposed French carbon tax springs to 
mind. However even if a small number of countries were to impose such sanctions it may 
be sufficient to reduce ex-post emissions below threshold levels. Consequently, robust 
and successful IEA”s are likely to require a mix of both transfer mechanisms deisnged to 
gain agreement to agree to emissions reductions as well as some type of private 
sanctions, mostly likely, tax instruments, in order to guarantee that successful agreements 
do not evaporate once they have served their purpose. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper presents a model of IEAs under the assumption that the global climate is an 
environmental threshold good. The agreement involves consensus between nations as to 
the level of abatement of greenhouse gas emissions and how the net benefits are to be 
shared. The model is used to examine incentives and disincentives for signing agreement 
due to a critical number of other players consenting to commit. The model is used to 
represent an IEA as a provision point mechanism and explore implications for the 
number of signatories needed to successfully reduce emissions below a harmful 
threshold. The central issue in climate change policy is to bring parties to a consensus 
regarding the level of harmful ambient greenhouse gas concentrations while the business 
as usual case continue to build the greenhouse gas levels with the increasing potential for 
concentrations to reach the unknown critical threshold. Not taking action then 
predisposes the global community an increasing risk of damage. 
We examined whether a high threshold - an emissions level that is unlikely to be reached, 
could lead to a smaller group of signatories in equilibrium? Then, can a partial agreement 
equilibrium induce emissions levels that drive the ambient greenhouse gas concentration 
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below the provision point? This is really the key practical question, because if this is not 
the case, then IEA will be ineffective in eradicating damage. 
Our findings allow us to conclude that a higher threshold for pollutants would in 
equilibrium result in a lower minimum threshold for membership of the coalition in an 
agreement that reduces emissions below damaging levels. This should be interpreted to 
mean that it would be hard to gain signatories to agreements if the damage threshold is 
high. Low thresholds which are easily crossed on the other hand and the success of which 
is easily achieved are easier to obtain commitment for a binding agreement. The 
downside of such agreements is that they may well not be robust as individual signatories 
may chose to defect because the benefits are shared by all nations whether or not they 
sign the agreement. 
Our analysis complements that of  Fuentes-Albero, & Rubio (2010) who found that 
heterogeneity between countries has no relevant effects on the scope of environmental 
cooperation in comparison with the homogeneous case if transfers are not allowed. With 
transfers, effects depend on the kind of asymmetry. If abatement costs are different, only 
limited cooperation can be bought through transfers. On the contrary, if the countries 
differ in terms of environmental damages, the level of cooperation increases with the 
degree of asymmetry.  
We aim to extend our analysis to consider how potential high abatement costs for 
developed nations can be a factor in inducing greater international cooperation.  
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